Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..

[Henning Schulzrinne <[e-mail]>]

Once numbers have public (STIR) keys, the sender should indeed be able to encrypt the information without creating a new infrastructure for distributing keys, and the destination carrier can decrypt. (I think I'm just amplifying slightly what you are saying, not disagreeing.)

Agreed on "who", although this may be implicit in some cases (e.g., if signed by the number-signing entity).

________________________________________
From: Brian Rosen [[e-mail]]
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2015 12:28 PM
To: Richard Shockey
Cc: Stephen Farrell; Henning Schulzrinne; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..

One possible extra bit is that we need to know WHO signed.  That could be easy (identity in a cert for the signature), but it’s a requirement.

I still want an optional confidence value, because the source is often not authoritative.

If we’re thinking we’re using the existing display name, and coming up with a way to sign it, then, like stir, the termination side can decide what it wants to do if it gets a display name but no signature.  The sender has the option to provide the name or not, and provide the signature or not.

We COULD consider a new header that would contain the name encrypted for a destination TN (To:).  That would afford privacy to the name to middle boxes that we would not have today with display name.  I would not be opposed to that.  This would work like the offline stir proposal, where the sender obtains the public key of the recipient and encrypts the name for the recipient.

Brian