Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..

Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net> Fri, 12 June 2015 16:28 UTC

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From: Brian Rosen <br@brianrosen.net>
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Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2015 09:28:22 -0700
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References: <D19F23AD.26CEA%richard@shockey.us> <E42CCDDA6722744CB241677169E8365603614617@MISOUT7MSGUSRDB.ITServices.sbc.com> <9588_1434045613_5579CCAD_9588_574_1_fki5dyxdmgyv92b6hugpfuoy.1434045608655@email.android.com> <E6A16181E5FD2F46B962315BB05962D07D354C94@fcc.gov> <9384_1434103912_557AB068_9384_7221_1_B5939C6860701C49AA39C5DA5189448B14C216E0@OPEXCLILM42.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <D1A05A04.26E84%richard@shockey.us> <E6A16181E5FD2F46B962315BB05962D07D355543@fcc.gov> <557AE9E4.5030205@cs.tcd.ie> <D1A0761F.26EE1%richard@shockey.us>
To: Richard Shockey <richard@shockey.us>
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Cc: "philippe.fouquart@orange.com" <philippe.fouquart@orange.com>, Henning Schulzrinne <Henning.Schulzrinne@fcc.gov>, "cnit@ietf.org" <cnit@ietf.org>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Subject: Re: [cnit] CNIT Charter bashing..
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One possible extra bit is that we need to know WHO signed.  That could be easy (identity in a cert for the signature), but it’s a requirement.

I still want an optional confidence value, because the source is often not authoritative.

If we’re thinking we’re using the existing display name, and coming up with a way to sign it, then, like stir, the termination side can decide what it wants to do if it gets a display name but no signature.  The sender has the option to provide the name or not, and provide the signature or not.

We COULD consider a new header that would contain the name encrypted for a destination TN (To:).  That would afford privacy to the name to middle boxes that we would not have today with display name.  I would not be opposed to that.  This would work like the offline stir proposal, where the sender obtains the public key of the recipient and encrypts the name for the recipient.

Brian

> On Jun 12, 2015, at 8:49 AM, Richard Shockey <richard@shockey.us> wrote:
> 
> 
> Henning is right. No one is forcing anything. Existing anonymous calling
> protections still apply.
> 
> 
> Again my point is that is a great many cases Interconnected SIP between NA
> carriers are covered by other security mechanisms.
> 
> Right now your Facetime session is totally in the clear. My concern is we
> end up going down the rat hole of trying to create perfect end to end
> security nothing will get done.
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/12/15, 10:17 AM, "Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12/06/15 15:13, Henning Schulzrinne wrote:
>>> In almost all cases of interest, the calling party *wants* to
>>> disclose accurate information to the called party, so the privacy
>>> issues don't seem to arise. They would only arise if there was forced
>>> disclosure; I don't think anybody is proposing that.
>> 
>> Privacy issues could also arise if a middlebox could now see
>> sensitive information that it previously could not see. I think
>> that is independent of whether disclosure is desired by either
>> of the endpoints.
>> 
>> S.
>> 
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