Re: [conex] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-conex-tcp-modifications-09: (with COMMENT)

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 09 October 2015 11:07 UTC

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [conex] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-conex-tcp-modifications-09: (with COMMENT)
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On 09/10/15 10:43, Mirja K├╝hlewind wrote:
> Hi Stephan,
> 
> quick reply to you comment below. The two points below are discussed in
> draft-ietf-conex-destopt as ConEx is signaled in the IP layer and the
> attacks would (from my point of view) only interfere with the signaling
> (and not any additional algorithms that are used in TCP to decide when
> to set a marking).
> 
> draft-ietf-conex-destopt even has an own section on "Mitigating flooding
> attacks by using preferential drop". I guess that's what you've been
> looking for, right?
> 
> Further, draft-ietf-conex-destopt says in the security section that
> IPsec AH can be used to detect changes to ConEx information. Actually it
> does not say what to do if such changes are detected. I'll check with my
> co-authors if we can add some more information here.
> 
> Regarding draft-ietf-conex-tcp-modifications, I've added two sentences
> at the beginning of the security section to say that these issues are
> discussed in draft-ietf-conex-destopt. Is that okay for you?

Seems good, thanks,
S.

> 
> Mirja
> 
> 
> 
> On 01.10.2015 13:56, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
>> draft-ietf-conex-tcp-modifications-09: No Objection
>>
>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>
>>
>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>
>>
>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-conex-tcp-modifications/
>>
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> COMMENT:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>> Seems like a fine thing to experiment with. I hope the results
>> are interesting.
>>
>> The security considerations really ought take into account or at
>> least mention potential misbehaviour by middleboxes and also how
>> conex might be affected by DoS attacks.
>>
>