Re: [conex] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-conex-destopt-09: (with COMMENT)

Bob Briscoe <ietf@bobbriscoe.net> Fri, 02 October 2015 08:21 UTC

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To: Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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From: Bob Briscoe <ietf@bobbriscoe.net>
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Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 09:21:09 +0100
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Subject: Re: [conex] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-conex-destopt-09: (with COMMENT)
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Suresh,

Sure - if Mirja is OK with that too.


Bob

On 02/10/15 05:08, Suresh Krishnan wrote:
> Hi Bob,
>     Thanks for your clarification. Since the security section seems to
> potentially have some dependence on the text needed for audit to address
> Robert's Gen-ART review, is it possible for you and Mirja to work
> offline and agree to some text before presenting it to the IESG?
>
> Thanks
> Suresh
>
> On 10/01/2015 06:06 PM, Bob Briscoe wrote:
>> Stephen, Suresh,
>>
>> As the person that contributed some of the text for this IPsec section,
>> I can see what's happened during the evolution of the doc...
>>
>> In section 4 it says
>>
>> CDO MUST be placed as the first option in the destination option
>> header before the AH and/or ESP (if present).  IPsec Authentication
>> Header (AH) MAY be used to verify that the CDO has not been modified.
>>
>> We started out writing Section 7 "Compatibility with use of IPsec" to
>> answering the question:
>> "What if IPsec is being used; how do we ensure ConEx is still visible?"
>> The answer was the above rule about placing CDO before AH and/or ESP.
>>
>> In the process, we showed how endpoints that were already authenticating
>> their IP headers with IPsec would automatically get coverage for the
>> ConEx header. By some perverse document evolution process, this has become:
>>
>> [Old]
>>
>> If the transport network cannot be trusted, IPsec Authentication
>> should be used to ensure integrity of the ConEx information.
>>
>> So I suggest the following change:
>>
>> [Proposed]
>>
>> If the endpoints are using the IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] to detect alteration of
>> IP headers along the path, AH will also ensure the e2e integrity of the CDO header.
>>
>> Actually, both parts of the subsequent sentence are wrong as well:
>>
>> [Old]
>>
>> If an attacker would be able to remove the ConEx marks, this could cause an
>> audit device to penalize the respective connection, while the sender
>> cannot easily detect that ConEx information is missing.
>>
>> a) Removing ConEx marks would make audit ignore those packets, not drop
>> them.
>> b) And It's not hard to design a protocol for the sender to detect
>> tampering with ConEx information.
>>
>> So I suggest instead:
>>
>> [Proposed]
>> A network-based attacker could alter ConEx information to fool an audit
>> function in a downstream network into discarding packets. An attack on
>> one network from another by changing an immutable field can be traced,
>> so it would be unlikely givennetwork operators care about their
>> reputation.Nonetheless, if ConEx information was being altered within a
>> network, IPsec AH or other more stealthy e2e integrity checks could be
>> useful tools to help pin-point the attack location.
>>
>> No need to say this, but a similar attack is already possible: decrement
>> TTL in one network to cause another network to drop packets. This is
>> less easy to trace too, because it uses a mutable field.
>>
>>
>> BTW, I designed the precursor to ConEx (re-ECN) to make it possible for
>> networks to identify other rogue networks mounting such attacks, without
>> needing e2e authentication. But all the inter-network security only
>> works with ECN, not drop. When we decided to use ConEx to expose drop as
>> well as ECN, I couldn't make the drop-based aspects support these nice
>> security properties. That is admitted in conex-abstract-mech. But the
>> ECN side of ConEx still supports all the inter-domain security. None of
>> the inter-domain security techniques are written in the ConEx drafts,
>> but they're in my PhD thesis, and referenced from conex-abstract-mech
>> Security Considerations.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bob
>>
>>
>>
>> On 01/10/15 09:31, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>> Hiya,
>>>
>>> On 01/10/15 04:52, Suresh Krishnan wrote:
>>>> Hi Stephen,
>>>>       Thanks for your comments. Please find responses inline
>>>>
>>>> On 09/30/2015 08:06 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>>>> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
>>>>> draft-ietf-conex-destopt-09: No Objection
>>>>>
>>>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>>>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-conex-destopt/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> COMMENT:
>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - section 7: "If the transport network cannot be trusted, IPsec
>>>>> Authentication should be used to ensure integrity of the ConEx
>>>>> information." Hmm. Transport networks cannot be trusted so the
>>>>> first condition is always met. That means you are saying IPsec
>>>>> should be used. I don't see how the key management required is
>>>>> going to happen and even if it did, would that affect conex
>>>>> calculations? I'm ok with an experiment on that basis though,
>>>>> but it'd be better if the real relationship between this and IPsec
>>>>> were more fully fleshed out somewhere as part of the experiment.
>>>> I am not sure if the form of key management chosen would affect the
>>>> conex calculations at all.
>>> My point is that the key management implied here is basically not
>>> going to happen. That means IPsec will not be used and hence conex
>>> calculations will need to take into account the potential for routers
>>> to mess with the CDO.
>>>
>>> And I think the text of this would be better if it recognised the
>>> improbability of IPsec being used in the wild, or else spoke to how
>>> one could arrange experiments so that use of IPsec is more likely.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> S.
>>>
>>>> I did read RFC5406 and I am still not sure
>>>> what can be said here about key management. I would really appreciate
>>>> some pointers/suggestions/text here.
>>>>
>>>>> - The secdir review [1] touches on similar issues. I'm not sure if
>>>>> that got a response, but it raises a good point that seems to me to
>>>>> deserve a response.
>>>>>
>>>>>        [1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg05957.html
>>>> I have added the following text in the Security Considerations section
>>>> of my local copy. Will submit this version after the telechat will check
>>>> with Robert. There is one item pending regarding audit in the Gen-ART
>>>> review and that may end up affecting this text.
>>>>
>>>>        This document does not define how audit mechanisms work in protocols
>>>>        that use this option and how those protocols can protect themselves
>>>>        from likely attacks.  This option MUST only be used alongside
>>>>        protocols that define the audit mechanisms and the means for
>>>>        protecting against likely attacks on such mechanisms.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks
>>>> Suresh
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/conex
>>>
>>> --
>>> ________________________________________________________________
>>> Bob Briscoe                               http://bobbriscoe.net/

-- 
________________________________________________________________
Bob Briscoe                               http://bobbriscoe.net/