Re: [core] comments on CORECONF drafts in WGLC

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Mon, 13 April 2020 22:23 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Ivaylo Petrov <ivaylo@ackl.io>
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Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2020 18:23:26 -0400
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Subject: Re: [core] comments on CORECONF drafts in WGLC
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Ivaylo Petrov <ivaylo@ackl.io> wrote:
    >> The security considerations, and authorization for this system is
    >> underspecified.  This was ultimately was killed SNMPv2, and led to a
    >> multi-decade long failure of SNMPv3.
    >> I suspect that this part will have a difficult time with security ADs.
    >>

    > [IP]: I tried to improve this section to some extent. Please let me know if
    > you have other ideas. Text contribution is always welcomed as well.

It's better.

    > [IP]: I added an informational link to ACE, which for me seems as one of
    > the ways authorization can be handled in COMI. Is this what you have in
    > mind?

I didn't really understand it the addition.

    > [IP]: I would imagine so.

    > I disagree with the Security Considerations, that knowing the list of
    >> modules helps the attacker to the extent that it is important to provide
    >> specific read controls on it.  Attackers already have a copy of the ROM ;-)
    >> I would say that the entire COMI interface needs authorized read access,
    >> and
    >> this module no more than any other module.
    >>

    > [IP]: I believe the idea here is that the attacker doesn't necessarily know
    > which ROM the device is using. Having an easy way to discover that and from
    > there all the possible vulnerabilities of that device is what we want to
    > avoid. Otherwise I agree that the entire CoMI interface needs authorized
    > read access.

I believe that the attacker will know exactly what the system under attack
is, and likely knows the ROM version, and probably has a copy of that ROM too.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-