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Re: [core] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-core-resource-directory-25: (with COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 13 August 2020 18:12 UTC

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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 11:12:42 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Robert Wilton <rwilton@cisco.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-core-resource-directory@ietf.org, jaime@iki.fi, jaime.jimenez@ericsson.com, core-chairs@ietf.org, core@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [core] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-core-resource-directory-25: (with COMMENT)
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On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 05:44:43AM -0700, Robert Wilton via Datatracker wrote:
>     5.3.  Operations on the Registration Resource
> 
>        An endpoint should not use this interface for registrations that it
>        did not create.  This is usually enforced by security policies, which
>        in general require equivalent credentials for creation of and
>        operations on a registration.
> 
> What happens if an endpoint is managing the registration and is upgraded to new
> hardware with a different certificate?  Would the updated endpoint expect to be
> able to update the registration?  Or would it have to wait for the existing
> registration to timeout (which could be a long time)?

Generally the authorization information in the certificate is just stored
in the subject (i.e., subjectAltName) of the certificate, so a new
certificate for the same name would pass the same authorization checks
(i.e., be "equivalent credentials").

-Ben

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