Re: [core] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-core-object-security-13

Thank you.  Those changes nicely address my concerns.
Yours,
Joel

On 7/26/18 2:41 AM, Francesca Palombini wrote:
> Hi Joel,
> 
> Thanks for your review! I now have updated the draft with improvements from your comments, see inline. Hope this clarifies.
> 
> Thanks,
> Francesca
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: core <core-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Joel Halpern
>> Sent: den 20 juli 2018 04:08
>> To: gen-art@ietf.org
>> Cc: draft-ietf-core-object-security.all@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org; core@ietf.org
>> Subject: [core] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-core-object-security-13
>>
>> Reviewer: Joel Halpern
>> Review result: Ready
>>
>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review
>> Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for
>> the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just like any other last call
>> comments.
>>
>> For more information, please see the FAQ at
>>
>> <https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>
>> Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-13
>> Reviewer: Joel Halpern
>> Review Date: 2018-07-19
>> IETF LC End Date: 2018-07-30
>> IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
>>
>> Summary: this document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard
>> RFC.
>>      My minor concerns from draft -08 have been addressed.
>>
>> Major issues: N/A
>>
>> Minor issues:
>>      Section 7.2 is about sequence numbers.  The first sentence in 7.2 discusses
>>      Nonces.  Then the discussion switches to sequence numbers?  My guess is
>>      that the Nonce is left over from previous text?
>>
> 
> Actually, the first sentence discusses nonces since they are constructed from Partial IVs, which are basically the Sequence Numbers. I added this precision, at the end of the second sentence.
> 
> OLD:  An AEAD nonce MUST NOT be used more than once per AEAD key. The uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs is shown in Appendix D.3, and in particular depends on a correct usage of Partial IVs.
> 
> NEW: An AEAD nonce MUST NOT be used more than once per AEAD key. The uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs is shown in Appendix D.3, and in particular depends on a correct usage of Partial IVs (which encode the Sender Sequence Numbers, see Section 5).
> 
>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>      In the first paragraph of 3.3, the text reads:
>>    The requirement that Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security
>>    contexts using the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context
>>    guarantees unique (key, nonce) pairs, which avoids nonce reuse.
>>      Unfortunately, that is not a grammatical sentence.
>>
>>
> 
> I think this sentence was too long to be readable, so I tried to split it up. Hopefully it makes more sense now.
> 
> NEW: This means that Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security contexts using the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context; such a requirement guarantees unique (key, nonce) pairs, which avoids nonce reuse.
> 
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