Re: [core] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-core-object-security-13

[Francesca Palombini <[e-mail]>]

Hi Joel,

Thanks for your review! I now have updated the draft with improvements from your comments, see inline. Hope this clarifies.

Thanks,
Francesca

> -----Original Message-----
> From: core <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Joel Halpern
> Sent: den 20 juli 2018 04:08
> To: [e-mail]
> Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: [core] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-core-object-security-13
> 
> Reviewer: Joel Halpern
> Review result: Ready
> 
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review
> Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for
> the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just like any other last call
> comments.
> 
> For more information, please see the FAQ at
> 
> <https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> 
> Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-13
> Reviewer: Joel Halpern
> Review Date: 2018-07-19
> IETF LC End Date: 2018-07-30
> IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
> 
> Summary: this document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard
> RFC.
>     My minor concerns from draft -08 have been addressed.
> 
> Major issues: N/A
> 
> Minor issues:
>     Section 7.2 is about sequence numbers.  The first sentence in 7.2 discusses
>     Nonces.  Then the discussion switches to sequence numbers?  My guess is
>     that the Nonce is left over from previous text?
> 

Actually, the first sentence discusses nonces since they are constructed from Partial IVs, which are basically the Sequence Numbers. I added this precision, at the end of the second sentence.

OLD:  An AEAD nonce MUST NOT be used more than once per AEAD key. The uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs is shown in Appendix D.3, and in particular depends on a correct usage of Partial IVs.

NEW: An AEAD nonce MUST NOT be used more than once per AEAD key. The uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs is shown in Appendix D.3, and in particular depends on a correct usage of Partial IVs (which encode the Sender Sequence Numbers, see Section 5).

> Nits/editorial comments:
>     In the first paragraph of 3.3, the text reads:
>   The requirement that Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security
>   contexts using the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context
>   guarantees unique (key, nonce) pairs, which avoids nonce reuse.
>     Unfortunately, that is not a grammatical sentence.
> 
> 

I think this sentence was too long to be readable, so I tried to split it up. Hopefully it makes more sense now.

NEW: This means that Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security contexts using the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context; such a requirement guarantees unique (key, nonce) pairs, which avoids nonce reuse.

> _______________________________________________
> core mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/core