Re: [COSE] draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs and deterministic ECDSA recommendations
Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 16 February 2021 17:59 UTC
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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
cc: "cose@ietf.org" <cose@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 12:59:01 -0500
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Subject: Re: [COSE] draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs and deterministic ECDSA recommendations
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John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > I don't think this is a good recommendation for IoT devices. In the > last 5 years, i.e. after work on RFC 8152 started, there has been a > large amount of academic papers showing that purely deterministic ECC > algorithms in accesable IoT devices suffers from side-channel and fault > injection attacks. For a list of papers see e.g. Seciton 1 of > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02 > I would suggest changing the SHOULD to MAY, but I know the draft is > already in RFC editors que... I will read your ID and think about it. In my experience, the use of randmized ECDSA has two negative effects: 1) it's really hard to judge quality of randomness when writing a library or module, and so even clueful application builders can miss this. 2) unit test cases wind up as non-deterministic, so either the randomized input is made deterministic, or the randomized version is just not tested. Since unit test cases often serve as documentation, which is copy&pasted, the result is that the randomized version is used with a constant input. We've seen this with DSA vs RSA back 20 years ago. I was really annoyed with ECDSA until the deterministic version came to light, and I really don't want to go back. > "Deterministic elliptic-curve signatures such as deterministic ECDSA > and EdDSA have gained popularity over randomized ECDSA as their > security do not depend on a source of high-quality randomness. Recent > research has however found that implementations of these signature > algorithms may be vulnerable to certain side-channel and fault > injection attacks due to their determinism. See e.g. Section 1 of > [draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise] for a list of attack papers." > Recommending deterministic ECDSA for IoT devices without any security > considerations would not be good. > FYI, CFRG has discussed and agreed that this is a problem. -- Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting ) Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
- [COSE] draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs and determ… John Mattsson
- Re: [COSE] draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs and de… Carsten Bormann
- Re: [COSE] draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs and de… Michael Richardson
- Re: [COSE] draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs and de… Carsten Bormann