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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "cose@ietf.org" <cose@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Is the COSE public key encoding inefficient ... was RE: [COSE]
 Next steps with COSE-HPKE .... was RE: HPKE: Ephemeral public key encoding
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cose/zg-PfuD2uUi_YgrOJ11wFpGiBbw>
Subject: [COSE] Is the COSE public key encoding inefficient ... was RE: Next
 steps with COSE-HPKE .... was RE: HPKE: Ephemeral public key encoding
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Hi Ilari, Hi Daisuke,

The main decision for the group is whether there is willingness to define n=
ew public key formats in addition to those already defined. A factor in the=
 decision making might be whether the existing format is insufficient.

It turns out that neither COSE nor HPKE define new cryptographic algorithms=
. They just use them, including their encoding. Section 13.1 of RFC 8152 (C=
OSE) defines the public key encoding of elliptic curve keys and references =
Section 2.2 of RFC 5480, which points to Section 2.3.3 "Elliptic-Curve-Poin=
t-to-Octet-String Conversion"  in [SEC1]. Section 7.1.1 of RFC 9180 (HPKE) =
references the uncompressed Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String in [SEC1],=
 which is in Section 2.3.3. This means that COSE and HPKE use the same enco=
ding for the public key (of the NIST curves).

Hence, all we are talking about here is carrying the information in slightl=
y different ways. Let's take the P256r1, for example:

Your proposed public key format for NIST P256r1 where you dump the key into=
 the -2 (x) field.

{
       / kty =3D> OKP /
        1: 1,
       / kid /
        2: h'1F677209D1C5174C',
      / crv =3D> -65537 (HPKE P256 with SHA256) /
        -1: -65537,
       / X-Y coordinates /
        -2: h'040E271193..69'
}

The existing format specified by COSE places the public key is separated in=
to two fields, x and y.  COSE also defines a compressed and an uncompressed=
 encoding of the public key (which we discussed at the list).
(FWIW HPKE references the uncompressed format.)

Here is the uncompressed format:

{
   / kty =3D> EC2 /
   1:2,
   / kid /
   2: h'1F677209D1C5174C',
   / crv =3D> P-256 /
   -1:1,
   / x =3D> x-coordinate /
    -2:h'0072...85e5c8f42ad',
   / y =3D> y-coordinate /
    -3:h'01dc...fe1ea1d9475',
}

Here is the compressed format:

{
   / kty =3D> EC2 /
   1:2,
   / kid /
   2: h'1F677209D1C5174C',
   / crv =3D> P-256 /
   -1:1,
   / x =3D> x-coordinate /
    -2:h'0072...85e5c8f42ad',
   / y =3D> y-coordinate (sign-bit) /
    -3:true,
}

So, this raises the question where the optimization potential is? While the=
 inefficiency was raised in discussions, I believe that this is not really =
the design goal here (as I will point out in my other email to Daisuke).

Ciao
Hannes

[SEC1] https://secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf

-----Original Message-----
From: COSE <cose-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Ilari Liusvaara
Sent: Thursday, September 1, 2022 7:02 PM
To: cose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [COSE] Next steps with COSE-HPKE .... was RE: HPKE: Ephemeral =
public key encoding

On Thu, Sep 01, 2022 at 11:00:56PM +0900, AJITOMI Daisuke wrote:
> Hi Hannes and Ilari
>
> As an implementor of HPKE library
> (https://github.com/dajiaji/hpke-js), let me offer my opinion.
>
> I strongly agree with Ilari's opinion.
>
> I don't know what kind of discussions were held in IETF114, HPKE spec
> (RFC9180) defines that a sender's ephemeral key (enc : encapsulated
> key) output by KEM is an octet string.
> I see no point in converting to the existing public key structure (JWK
> for COSE), which would rather lead to more complex specifications and
> implementations, and cause security issues.

There is a video recording of the session on IETF youtube channel.
IIRC, it discussed the NIST curve case, but not the CFRG curves.

As for concerns about extending OKP to non-curves, OKP was meant for that f=
rom the very begninning and the specification specifically says that it doe=
s (albeit not in the clearest way).


For uncompressed NIST curves, such re-encoding would save some space, which=
 can be surprisingly valuable.

For P-256, it allows compressing 65 bytes to 43.
For P-384, it allows compressing 97 bytes to 59.
For P-256, it allows compressing 133 bytes to 77.

Adding compact NIST curves to HPKE would make this obsolete, as keys are ev=
en smaller than the compressed ones given above. I think the COSE-HPKE spec=
 should register the codepoints, unless someone else gets there first (ther=
e has been at least one I-D proposing exactly that, but it seems to have go=
tten stuck in some process hole).


> Of course, existing key structures could be used to represent the
> recipient's public key.
> However, the sender's ephemeral key depends on the recipient's public
> key information, and there is no need to specify the many parameters
> such as kty, crv, alg, etc. which is already determined by the
> recipient's public key.

Here, one potential issue is that the eph header is defined to take COSE_KE=
Y and does not allow direct-bstr. There are a few options:

1) Define a new parameter that allows bstr.
   Drawback: New parameter.
2) Redefine eph to allow bstr.
   Drawback: Comparable to allowing int in kid, which was controversial.
3) Abuse symmetric kty.
   Drawback: Wastes 3 bytes.

(My test implementation does the option 3.)


> In my opinion, the required attributes for the sender's ephemeral key
> related information are as follows:
> - kid: bstr. the recipient's public key identifier.
> - ek (or enc?): bstr. the sender's ephemeral public key.
> - kdf: int(2-byte). optional. the KDF identifier selected by the
> sender if the recipient's public key supports more than one KDF algorithm=
.
> - aead: int(2-byte). optional. the AEAD identifier selected by the
> sender if the recipient's public key supports more than one AEAD
> algorithm. kdf and aead might be able to be combined into one parameter.
> - ver: int (2-byte). optional?. the version of the HPKE application.
> An HPKE application will probably specify how to use INFO and AAD. It
> is necessary to define a version of the specification which could be upda=
ted.
>
> Finally, I think we can learn a lot from other standards that use HPKE:
> ECH, ODoH, and OHTTP quite naturally use "enc" as it is, as an octet stri=
ng.

As what my test implementation of COSE-HPKE currently does:

- Public/Private keys are always OKP, with special crv values
  (compressing long-term keys is not supported, since these infrequent
  on constrained channels).
- The crv value also species the kdf to use (chosen to match kem as
  closely as possible).
- kid is used for key filtering. Especially for COSE_Encrypt0, which
  only does single attempt at decryption.
- alg is used for specifying AEAD to use, again using special values.
- The encapsulated key is put into eph field.
  - This primarily abuses kty symmetric, k is the raw key.
  - NIST curves can also use EC2 keys for compressed form, since
    encapsulated keys are common on constrained channels.
- The crv and alg mappings are build time genrated from table. If
  the underlying HPKE library supports it, adding new alg or crv
  is one line addition.
- The underlying HPKE library has one major quirk: It has support
  functions for that EC2 curve compression/decompression (going so
  far as to use the COSE codepoints for designating the curves).
- If only single recipient is needed COSE_Encrypt0 can be used
  instead of COSE_Encrypt saves few dozen bytes.
- There is 8MB message size limit when decrypting, but ciphertext
  might not count. Largest message sizes I have tested exceed 20GB.



-Ilari

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