Re: [Curdle] Looking for comments on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2

["Mark D. Baushke" <[e-mail]>]

Ron Frederick <[e-mail]> writes:

> This generally looks good to me.

I am still going back over some of the comments that ekr provided...

> Here are a few more detailed comments:
> 
> - Sections 3.14 and 3.15 list the ext-info values as SHOULD (which I
>   agree with). However, your table in section 5 has them marked as
>   MAY.

Updated in my copy.

> - I noticed you dropped diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST
>   to SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I’d still like to
>   see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, and think this is
>   probably the safest candidate for that.

How long is a 2048-bit prime, even with such a large q-ordered subgroup
likely to remain viable?

1024-bits for:

  a) IFC RSA, 
  b) FFC DSA, and 
  c) FFC DH,
  d) as well as FFC DH group5 (1536-bits)

are all considered too weak now.

3DES with 112-bits of security is being phased out as of January 1, 2024.

When should we expect to see 2048-bit RSA, which also nominally has only
112-bits of security as does 2048-bit DSA become retired?

To me, it looks like the better bet would be the 3072-bit MODP prime of
group15, but I do not see it being adopted by most implementations.

I might suggest Curve25519, as it is pretty fast and has many
implementations.

That said, there are many who have been doing research which seems to
show that ECC is easier to break with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC
and are NOT interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.

I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have said they
would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH implementations.

> - I’m also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a good
>   candidate for a SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I’m not sure we have
>   consensus on that.

Yup, I have not seen any consensus on this issue as yet.

Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a
MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they wish
as long as q = (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... though
I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g is created perhaps
not providing that g^q mod p == 1 is a will formed subgroup. When it is
not a well-formed subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of the
key value.

> - I agree with the downgrade of diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 from
>   SHOULD to MAY.

Okay.

> - Regarding possible ECDSA algorithms, I implemented the secp256k1
>   curve as ecdh-sha21.3.132.0.10 in AsyncSSH after seeing it was

I think you mean ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 here?

>   implemented by Bitvise. I don’t know if it is worth mentioning here
>   explicitly, but it’s one real-world example of an ecdh-sha2-*
>   algorithm not explicitly given a name in RFC 5656. The ‘endsa-sha2’
>   algorithm with this curve is also supported.

The reserved name is for ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1 or
ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be better...
depending on what Bitvise uses.

I think you might as well use the name, the Koblitz curve names are
present in RFC 4492.

    b'1.3.132.0.10': (ec.SECP256K1, SHA256),
    b'1.3.132.0.34': (ec.secp384r1, SHA384),
    b'1.3.132.0.35': (ec.secp521r1, SHA512),

For that matter, as long as you are going to use vanity curve for Bitcoin;

Why not use the RFC 7027 ECC Brainpool curves too?

    b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7':  (ec.brainpoolP256r1, SHA256),
    b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11': (ec.brainpoolP384r1, SHA384),
    b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13': (ec.brainpoolP512r1, SHA512),
  
That said, given that they are named in RFC 7027, using their names may
be better too.

Does anyone else want me to add either the Koblitz or Brainpool names or
OIDs to this IETF draft?

	Be safe, stay healthy,
	-- Mark

> --
> Ron Frederick
> [e-mail]