Re: [Curdle] AD Review of draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 7:19 PM, denis bider <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> I think this misunderstands the scope of the GSS draft.
>
> The GSS draft discusses GSS key exchange methods for SSH. These are not
> the main key exchange methods for SSH, they are a *version* of the main
> key exchange methods for use with GSS.
>
> Because these are a *version* of the main key exchange methods, the main
> value of this draft is that it updates the GSS key exchange methods to be
> in line with how the main key exchange methods for SSH have evolved.
>
> As Mark has pointed out, we have already added these key exchange methods
> to SSH in RFC 8268:
>
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
> diffie-hellman-group15-sha512
> diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
> diffie-hellman-group17-sha512
> diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
>
> The whole argument about which groups and which hashes we should have has
> already been staged, multiple times, and this is what we arrived at.
>
> The GSS draft is merely mirroring what we have already done for use with
> the GSS key exchange methods. It does not make sense for the GSS key
> exchange methods to do something entirely different than what the main key
> exchange methods do. It makes sense for the GSS key exchange methods to be
> consistent with what we have already done for the main ones.
>

OK. I regret not noticing this when I reviewed the SSH document, but as you
say, it's too late now.

-Ekr


> On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 7:23 AM, Salz, Rich <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> I see no point in adding another hash.  What’s the reason?
>>>
>>
>> So that you can have an implementation that spans a variety of groups
>> with just SHA-256.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>