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Re: [Curdle] sntrup761x25519-sha512

Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> Tue, 16 May 2023 06:46 UTC

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Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 14:46:04 +0800
From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
To: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Simon Josefsson <simon=40josefsson.org@dmarc.ietf.org>, curdle@ietf.org, ietf-ssh@netbsd.org
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] sntrup761x25519-sha512
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On 2023-05-15 9:40 pm, Simo Sorce wrote:
> Is it worth waiting until the final NIST candidates parameters are
> published and provide a full set of post quantum resistant algorithms
> at that time?
> 
> (Work on how to use those curves can start earlier, but publication
> should wait until algorithms are official.

sntrup761 doesn't seem to be a candidate any more for NIST 
standardisation.
There's Kyber as the round 3 choice, then some other round 4 candidates 
[1]

Has anyone asked the OpenSSH developers if they have future plans for 
sntrup761?

Cheers,
Matt

[1] 
https://csrc.nist.gov/News/2022/pqc-candidates-to-be-standardized-and-round-4

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