[Curdle] Adam Roach's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves-11: (with COMMENT)

Adam Roach via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Wed, 04 September 2019 04:12 UTC

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Subject: [Curdle] Adam Roach's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves-11: (with COMMENT)
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Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves-11: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Thanks for the work on documenting this key exchange method.

I'm a little surprised that there is no discussion of deployment considerations
for deploying "curve25519-sha256" into an environment in which
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" is already well-established (as described in the
introduction), or of sunsetting the vendor-specific version. Some advice on
which algorithms to offer and which ones to accept would probably be
worthwhile, especially if there is any long-term hope of retiring the
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" designator in favor of the standard one.