Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-19: (with COMMENT)
Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com> Mon, 19 July 2021 14:37 UTC
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From: Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2021 07:36:48 -0700
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To: "Mark Baushke (ietf)" <mbaushke@gmail.com>
Cc: draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2@ietf.org, curdle-chairs@ietf.org, curdle@ietf.org, Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-19: (with COMMENT)
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I'm not going to say no to more explanation, but my complaint is much more pedestrian than that: the sentence structure makes it hard to figure out what you're talking about. Breaking it down SHA2-256 is a reasonable hash // your new paragraph explains what "reasonable" means, though I was fine with that bt in both the KDF and integrity // I think you mean "for use in the both KDF and integrity". // but also "the integrity" sounds very odd to my ears; do you mean "the integrity verification", or is "the integrity" a term of art? in both gss and non-gss uses of curve25519 key exchange methods. // is this modifying 'integrity' or a reasonable hash. Here's a proposed rewording written with no understanding of the underlying tech: "SHA2-256 is a reasonable hash for use in both the KDF and integrity check. It is reasonable for both gss and non-gss uses of curve25519 key exchange methods." Martin On Sat, Jul 17, 2021 at 6:43 AM Mark Baushke (ietf) <mbaushke@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Martin, > > Comment in-line below. > > > On Jul 6, 2021, at 11:48 AM, Martin Duke via Datatracker < > noreply@ietf.org> wrote: > > > > Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for > > draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-19: No Objection > > > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > > > > Please refer to > https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > > for more information about DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/ > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > COMMENT: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Two nits: > > > > (1.1) this is optional, but > > > > s/man in the middle/on-path attacker > > Agreed. > > > > > Or other suitable synonym > > > > (3.1.1) and (3.1.2) I cannot parse the sentences with the phrase "is a > > reasonable hash...", e.g. > > > > SHA2-256 is a reasonable hash in both the KDF and integrity in both gss > and > > non-gss uses of curve25519 key exchange methods. > > > > Can you reword? > > Benjamin Kaduk already answered your question, but I do not know if it was > satisfying or if the document should be updated. > > I could add the following paragraph to section 3.1. > > RFC4253 section 7.2 "Output of Key Exchange" defines > generation of a shared secret K (really the output of the KDF) > and an exchange key hash H. Each key exchange method uses a > specified HASH function which must be the same for both key > exchange and Key Derivation. H is used for key exchange > integrity across the SSH session as it is computed only once. > It is noted at the end of the 7.2 section that "This process > will lose entropy if the amount of entropy in K is larger than > the internal state size of HASH." so care must be taken that > the hashing algorithm used is well chosen ("reasonable") for > the key exchange algorithms being used. > > Please let me know if adding something like that will improve what 3.1.1 > and 3.1.2 are trying to say. > > Be safe, stay healthy > -- Mark > > > >
- [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf… Martin Duke via Datatracker
- Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-… mbaushke ietf
- Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-… Mark Baushke (ietf)
- Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-… Martin Duke
- Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-… Mark Baushke
- Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-… Martin Duke