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Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-19: (with COMMENT)

Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com> Tue, 20 July 2021 03:35 UTC

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From: Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2021 20:34:41 -0700
Message-ID: <CAM4esxSq9bPddhBP0mjfGJV1fungyVXzpB2aGX6=qcvPfhA2yA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mark Baushke <mbaushke@gmail.com>
Cc: draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2@ietf.org, curdle-chairs@ietf.org, curdle@ietf.org, Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-19: (with COMMENT)
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Yes, that scratches my itch

On Mon, Jul 19, 2021, 19:59 Mark Baushke <mbaushke@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Martin,
>
> On Jul 19, 2021, at 7:36 AM, Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> SHA2-256 is a reasonable hash for use in both the KDF and integrity check.
> It is reasonable for both gss and non-gss uses of curve25519 key exchange
> methods.
>
>
> Ah. I think I understand your confusion. That said, it is not an integrity
> check, rather it is a way of ensuring that the session integrity is
> maintained across many different rekeying events. As such, something like
> this may be closer to what you want:
>
>             SHA2-256 is a reasonable hash for use in both the KDF and
>             session integrity. It is reasonable for both gss and
>             non-gss uses of curve25519 key exchange methods.
>
> A similar paragraph is provided for the SHA2-512 hash.
>
>         Be safe, stay healthy
>         -- Mark
>
>
>
>

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