Re: [Curdle] new-AD review comments on draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-08
Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Thu, 09 May 2019 10:34 UTC
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2@ietf.org, curdle@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 09 May 2019 12:34:40 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] new-AD review comments on draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-08
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On Wednesday, 8 May 2019 17:06:04 CEST Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > Hi all, > > I'm almost ready to send draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2 to the IESG for > evaluation, but would like to see a new revision posted first, mostly for > the Abstract changes. In addition to the changes mentioned below, please > also go ahead and make the editorial changes mentioned in the last > call/directorate reviews. > > -Ben > > Abstract > > This document specifies additions and amendments to RFC4462. It > defines a new key exchange method that uses SHA-2 for integrity and > deprecates weak DH groups. The purpose of this specification is to > > I think we need to remove this statement about "deprecates weak DH groups"; > I didn't see any further discussion of such deprecations in any revision of > the document. we've done that by not listing them, would you prefer to list them explicitly in section 6 and Section 4 with a "MUST NOT" in "Implementation Support" and "Implementation Recommendations"? > Section 2 > > Following the > rationale of [RFC8268] only SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes are used for > DH groups. For NIST curves the same curve-to-hashing algorithm > pairing used in [RFC5656] is adopted for consistency. > > 8268 doesn't provide a whole lot of rationale for using SHA-256, rather, > the closest thing to guidance would be in Section 1 where it cites the NSA > IAD FAQ that wants to *avoid* using SHA-256. So perhaps it's better to say > that this just follows the practice of 8268, rather than the rationale from > it, especially since we are just using a "consistency" argument for the > NIST curves' hashes. yes, "practice" would work better in this context -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republic
- [Curdle] new-AD review comments on draft-ietf-cur… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Curdle] new-AD review comments on draft-ietf… Mark D. Baushke
- Re: [Curdle] new-AD review comments on draft-ietf… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Curdle] new-AD review comments on draft-ietf… Hubert Kario
- Re: [Curdle] new-AD review comments on draft-ietf… Simo Sorce
- Re: [Curdle] new-AD review comments on draft-ietf… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Curdle] new-AD review comments on draft-ietf… Benjamin Kaduk