Re: [Curdle] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-09: (with COMMENT)
Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Tue, 25 June 2019 16:50 UTC
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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>, Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, curdle-chairs@ietf.org, curdle@ietf.org
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 18:49:48 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-09: (with COMMENT)
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On Monday, 24 June 2019 16:38:56 CEST Roman Danyliw via Datatracker wrote: > Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-09: No Objection > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2/ > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > ** Section 5.1, Per “The exchange hash SHOULD be kept secret”, when should > it not be (i.e., why isn’t this a MUST?)? this is reiteration of the language from RFC 4253, page 23 given how RSA signatures work, it's impossible to keep it secret in all circumstances so it can't be a MUST. That being said I'm not aware of any way to attack the handshake if that value is exposed so it looks to be here for "abundance of caution" reason... > ** Section 4 and 5.2. Per “Each key exchange method id implicitly > registered by this document”, aren’t these key exchange methods explicitly > registering them in IANA-KEX-NAMES per Section 7? no, the * is a wildcard character here, we don't explicitly list names that will be used > ** Section 5.1. It is worth repeating (or moving the text) to Section 8 > that the Security Considerations of RFC7546 apply repeating probably would be better > ** Section 5.1. The various variable (e.g., V_C, V_S) are introduced early > in the algorithm to construct H and the messages in page 6, but they aren’t > described until the end of page 7. I wasn’t following the narrative until > I hit that section. those come from RFC 4253, a prerequisite to implement this I-D -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republic
- [Curdle] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ie… Roman Danyliw via Datatracker
- Re: [Curdle] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draf… Hubert Kario
- Re: [Curdle] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draf… Simo Sorce
- Re: [Curdle] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draf… Simo Sorce