Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-07 intended status

[Daniel Migault <[e-mail]>]

Thanks for the response. I updated the shepherd writeup with these information. 
Yours, 
Daniel

-----Original Message-----
From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] 
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 11:34 AM
To: Daniel Migault <[e-mail]>
Cc: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-07 intended status

On Tue, Jan 02, 2018 at 04:37:55PM +0000, Daniel Migault wrote:
> Hi IIlari,
> 
> Thank you for the follow up. I just received a few days ago a 
> notification to complete the "Document Quality" section in the 
> shepherd writeup which requires a a status on the implementations.
> I sent a few hours a go a request to the co-authors of known 
> implementations. If you are aware of such implementations, feel free 
> to create a new project at [1].
> 
> You can also let us know on the mailing (with associated URLs) these 
> projects so I can complete code stand as well as the shepherd writeup.  
> I am happy to complete it today 😉
> 
> For the status you are correct but I believe it should not cause any issue. 

I do not have/know full implementation, however I do have a partial implementation in context of TLS:

- Ed25519/Ed448 PKIX public keys in certificates.
- (Ed25519/Ed448 TLS exchange signatures -- covered by TLS docs)
- Ed25519/Ed448 PKIX certificate signatures.

And GnuTLS 3.6.1 supports at least:

- Ed25519 PKIX private keys (at least v1)
- Ed25519 PKIX public keys in certificates
- (Ed25519 TLS exchange signatures -- covered by TLS docs)
- Ed25519 PKIX certificate signatures.


My implementation interoperates with GnuTLS 3.6.1 on TLS handshake with both Ed25519 server signature and  certificate signature.

- Server: My implementation, all settings at defaults.
- Client: GnuTLS 3.6, all settings at defaults except trustpile
  replaced with custom one.
- Certificate 0: EE, Ed25519 key, Ed25519 signature.
- Certificate 1: CA, Ed25519 key, RSA-PSS-SHA256 signature.
- Certificate 2: CA, RSAEncryption key, RSA-PKCS1-SHA256 signature.
- Certificate 3: CA, RSAEncryption key, self-signed. [Not sent].
- Negotiated TLS versionn: TLS 1.2 + RENEGO + EMS.

(The key exchange used is ECDHE_ECDSA for technical reasons, however, there are no actual ECDSA used anywhere).


Client status at end of handshake:

- Description: (TLS1.2)-(ECDHE-X25519)-(EdDSA-Ed25519)-(CHACHA20-POLY1305)
- Session ID: (empty)
- Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman parameters
 - Using curve: X25519
 - Curve size: 256 bits
- Version: TLS1.2
- Key Exchange: ECDHE-ECDSA
- Server Signature: EdDSA-Ed25519
- Cipher: CHACHA20-POLY1305
- MAC: AEAD
- Options: extended master secret, safe renegotiation,
- Handshake was completed


Server status at end of handshake:


Handshake complete, crypto parameters:
 - TLS version:              1.2
 - Encryption:               Chacha20-Poly1305
 - PRF:                      SHA-256
 - Key Exchange:             X25519
 - Server Signature:         Ed25519
 - Triple Handshake attack:  Fixed
 - OCSP stapling:            No
 - Certificate Transparency: No


-Ilari