Re: [Curdle] [kitten] Diffie-Hellman modulus sizing in Kerberos PKINIT

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 30 July 2021 16:50 UTC

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Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2021 09:49:35 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Cc: curdle@ietf.org, kitten@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [kitten] Diffie-Hellman modulus sizing in Kerberos PKINIT
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Thanks, Robbie!

MUST 4k and MAY 2k is not what my first instinct would have been, but on
further reflection it seems defensible as forward-looking guidance.

-Ben

On Fri, Jul 30, 2021 at 10:31:14AM -0400, Robbie Harwood wrote:
> Hi curdle + kitten,
> 
> I've put together a short document to update the minimum DH modulus size
> used in Kerberos Public Key Initial Authentication (RFC 4556), similar
> to what RFC 8270 did for SSH.
> 
> It can be found at:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-harwood-krb-pkinit-dh-upsize/
> 
> Be well,
> --Robbie



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