[Curdle] Lars Eggert's Discuss on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-19: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Lars Eggert via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Mon, 12 July 2021 13:21 UTC

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Subject: [Curdle] Lars Eggert's Discuss on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-19: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Lars Eggert has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-19: Discuss

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

This document seems to have unresolved IANA issues, so I am holding a DISCUSS
for IANA until the issues are resolved.


----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Found terminology that should be reviewed for inclusivity:
 * Term "man"; alternatives might be "individual", "people", "person".
 * Term "traditional"; alternatives might be "classic", "classical",
   "common", "conventional", "customary", "fixed", "habitual", "historic",
   "long-established", "popular", "prescribed", "regular", "rooted",
   "time-honored", "universal", "widely used", "widespread".
See https://www.rfc-editor.org/part2/#inclusive_language for background and
more guidance.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All comments below are about very minor potential issues that you may choose to
address in some way - or ignore - as you see fit. Some were flagged by
automated tools (via https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool), so there
will likely be some false positives. There is no need to let me know what you
did with these suggestions.

Section 1. , paragraph 10, nit:
> ere have been attacks against SHA-1 and it is no longer strong enough for SS
>                                    ^^^^
Use a comma before "and" if it connects two independent clauses (unless they
are closely connected and short).

Section 1.1. , paragraph 5, nit:
> ally very difficult to perform, but is is desirable that any key exchanging u
>                                     ^^^^^
Possible typo: you repeated a word.

Section 1.1. , paragraph 6, nit:
> patibility, it would be desirable it be listed last in the preference list o
>                                      ^^
After "it", use the third-person verb form "is".

Section 1.2.2. , paragraph 3, nit:
> rithm specified in [RFC4432]. RSA 1024 bit keys have approximately 80 bits of
>                                   ^^^^^^^^
When "1024-bit" is used as a modifier, it is usually spelled with a hyphen.

Section 1.2.2. , paragraph 3, nit:
> 80 bits of security strength. RSA 2048 bit keys have approximately 112 bits o
>                                   ^^^^^^^^
When "2048-bit" is used as a modifier, it is usually spelled with a hyphen.

Section 1.2.2. , paragraph 3, nit:
> rength needed for 3des-cbc, an RSA 2048 bit key matches the security strength
>                                    ^^^^^^^^
When "2048-bit" is used as a modifier, it is usually spelled with a hyphen.

Section 3.1.1. , paragraph 3, nit:
> s (nistp256, nistp384, nistp521) as well as other curves to be defined for t
>                                  ^^^^^^^^^^
Probable usage error. Use "and" after "both".

Section 3.2.2. , paragraph 2, nit:
> algorithm is used both in the KDF as well as for the integrity of the respons
>                                   ^^^^^^^^^^
Probable usage error. Use "and" after "both".

Section 3.2.2. , paragraph 2, nit:
> ing partially-broken algorithms laying around is not a good thing to do. The
>                                 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Did you mean "lying around"?

Section 4. , paragraph 3, nit:
> ing some of these groups as found in an this draft: Darren Tucker for OpenSS
>                                      ^^
Did you mean "and" or "any"?

Section 4. , paragraph 3, nit:
> ange methods that are considered weak so they are not in still actively in op
>                                      ^^^
Use a comma before "so" if it connects two independent clauses (unless they are
closely connected and short).

These URLs in the document can probably be converted to HTTPS:
 * http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-16