Re: [Curdle] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-09: (with COMMENT)

Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Mon, 01 July 2019 17:31 UTC

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From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2@ietf.org, daniel.migault@ericsson.com, curdle-chairs@ietf.org, curdle@ietf.org
Date: Mon, 01 Jul 2019 13:30:49 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-09: (with COMMENT)
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On Mon, 2019-06-24 at 07:38 -0700, Roman Danyliw via Datatracker wrote:
> ** Section 5.1, Per “The exchange hash SHOULD be kept secret”, when should it
> not be (i.e., why isn’t this a MUST?)?

This is the same text that appears in both 4253 and 4462, it is a
SHOULD because revealing the exchange hash may help an attacker to gain
some information about the exchange but it is not in itself a problem
if it happens.

Simo.

-- 
Simo Sorce
RHEL Crypto Team
Red Hat, Inc