Re: [Dance] Benjamin Kaduk's Yes on charter-ietf-dance-00-01: (with COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 10 September 2021 03:46 UTC

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Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2021 20:46:11 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
Cc: Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, dance-chairs@ietf.org, dance@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Dance] Benjamin Kaduk's Yes on charter-ietf-dance-00-01: (with COMMENT)
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On Wed, Sep 08, 2021 at 10:31:44AM -0700, Wes Hardaker wrote:
> Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> writes:
> 
> > "shared PKI root of trust" seems to imply that both parties have
> > credentials that chain up to the same root of trust (or at least that
> > the level of trust in the root is shared between parties), which need
> > not be the case.  In principle the parties can use credentials anchored
> > at different roots of trust, so long as the verifier is willing to use
> > the corresponding root of trust for this purpose.  So we might say
> > instead "and a root of trust deemed valid by the entity validating the
> > authenticated identity".  Or we could ignore it, and try to not be
> > overly pedantic.
> 
> Although that's a very valid point, I'd argue we should aim for more
> readable over perfect and I'm personally thinking we should leave the
> existing, easier to understand, language in place.

Right, that's why I put the "overly pedantic" in "overly pedantic nits" :)

-Ben