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Re: [dane] [Trans] CT for DNSSEC

Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> Mon, 20 March 2017 22:43 UTC

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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2017 15:43:20 -0700
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To: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
Cc: trans@ietf.org, IETF DANE Mailinglist <dane@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dane] [Trans] CT for DNSSEC
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On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 11:46 AM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

>
> > On Mar 17, 2017, at 2:20 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
> >
> >> Is this because you're worried about the parent removing evidence of
> DNSSEC
> >> for the child in the spoofing scenario?
> >
> > No, this is because the parent can spoof any data for the child. It is
> unrelated to DNSSEC.
>
> With qname minimization, the parent will first need to deny an NS
> RRset for the child, and those DOE records are better candidates
> for logging than routine non-NS queries.


Can you expand on how the the DOE record (which I assumes means
denial-of-existance) could work with an
adversarial parent?

The only approach I can think of is some sort of UI support which isn't
very compelling.  (Perhaps monitors
but alas I not really up-to-date where things are at with monitors and
gossip)


>   So logging can be limited
> to NS/DS queries, but that still leaves us with the problem of how
> to avoid logging non-existence of NS/DS for all the sundry leaf
> nodes. The public suffix list might be a useful resource here...
>

I agree.

-Wei


>
> --
>         Viktor.
>
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