Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible?

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Thu, 31 July 2014 19:29 UTC

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Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 15:29:08 -0400
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Subject: Re: [dane] Manipulation of DNSSEC by US government possible?
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John,
> ...
> Yes, not only can anyone distribute the public keys of the TLDs, but
> each TLD public key is readily accessible at any time from anywhere on
> the Internet, by sending a single DNS request to any of the root servers.
> This is one of the improvements that DNSSEC made, over the prior art
> of public key infrastructure.
If generic PKIs could assume a single TA, then the same model has
always been possible. DNS has the advantage of having a single
root, and a robust infrastructure supporting distribution of data
about the next tier of the DNS.  This allows DNSSEC to offer the
functionality you describe. it is not an improvement over the prior
art of PKI.

Steve