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Re: [dane] Behavior in the face of no answer?

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Tue, 15 May 2012 17:04 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: ekr@rtfm.com (Eric Rescorla)
Date: Tue, 15 May 2012 19:04:34 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBOX_WGf2hv=+rdA_YG4x5Pw0--snThZh+7yRrHNRwGYeg@mail.gmail.com> from "Eric Rescorla" at May 15, 12 09:55:27 am
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Cc: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org, dane@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dane] Behavior in the face of no answer?
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Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 9:52 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> > And as a fallback, browsers could use a TLSA & server-cert lock, i.e.
> > memorizing information from the last visit of a site and using that
> > to perform server endpoint identification in case that DNSSEC lookups
> > fail when roaming.
> 
> At which point it's hard to understand how this is better than cert pinning
> via HSTS.

Such a TLSA & server-cert lock is supposed to be transient substitute for
the lack of DNSSEC connectivity.  That memorized information will need
to be updated whenever full DNSSEC connectivity is available.

-Martin

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