Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS's new raw public keys
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org> Wed, 04 June 2014 14:44 UTC
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Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 14:44:08 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
To: dane@ietf.org
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References: <538C86C7.8000805@cs.tcd.ie> <20140602145215.GP27883@mournblade.imrryr.org> <20140602172922.GS27883@mournblade.imrryr.org> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1406030056500.19868@bofh.nohats.ca> <20140603130839.GY27883@mournblade.imrryr.org> <m3ppip5s57.fsf@carbon.jhcloos.org> <20140604025535.GJ27883@mournblade.imrryr.org> <m3bnu93yzc.fsf@carbon.jhcloos.org> <20140604134441.GN27883@mournblade.imrryr.org> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1406041013410.23900@bofh.nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS's new raw public keys
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On Wed, Jun 04, 2014 at 10:22:33AM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote: > >(skip oob when somewhat likely to fail and the client implements use of PKIX certs). > > It's not "likely to fail" when there is an exising "3 1 x" TLSA record > published! Sure it is, those record might match only a future or past server key when other RR parameter combinations are also present. Unless we define such transitions as invalid, and publish server-operator guidelines that place the burden on the server to avoid such states. Is that the WG's preference? I can strengthen the key rotation guidelines in the OPs draft (looks like it is about to morph into a standards track 6698 update) to require server operators to avoid transition states in which any of the published C/U/M combinations match only future or only past keys. This requires some attention to detail when updating TLSA RRs, and a tricky process when switching from "311" to "201": 1. 311 old self-signed leaf 2. 311 old leaf + 311 new DANE-TA issued leaf (wait for 1 to age out then deploy new cert chain). 3. 201 new DANE-TA issued chain (previously published as 311 in step 2). at each stage there are now C/U/M combinations that don't match any "active" key. > Leaves me puzzled even more about what you _are_ trying to convey as > the requirement for not mixing "3 1 x" and other types. Consider the above transition from a 311 self-signed cert to a DANE-TA(2) issued cert, in which the server operator is in a hurry, and we've not yet mandated the above process: 1. 311 old self-signed leaf 2. 311 old (still active) leaf + 201 planned TA (wait for 1 to age out, then activate new chain). 3. Drop 311 leaving only 201. This this, "oob" clients lose at step 2 when the new chain is activated, but the RRset has "311" only for obsolete keys and a "201" for the active keys. Note, this is not a "misconfiguration" in any sense with respect to 6698, and is not a problem prior to the introduction of "oob" negotiation. -- Viktor.
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Hoffman
- [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS's n… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… James Cloos
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Wes Hardaker
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… James Cloos
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… James Cloos
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Jim Schaad
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… James Cloos
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Tom Gindin
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… James Cloos
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… James Cloos
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… James Cloos
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Simon Arlott
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Servers which offer RPK but have no TL… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Servers which offer RPK but have no TL… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Servers which offer RPK but have no TL… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Servers which offer RPK but have no TL… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni
- [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS's n… John Gilmore
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Paul Wouters
- Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS… Viktor Dukhovni