Re: [dane] Network errors ARE attacks - on the end-to-end-principle

[Warren Kumari <[e-mail]>]

On May 16, 2012, at 11:19 AM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:

> On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 07:13:16PM -0700, John Gilmore wrote:
> 
>> "Genuine network errors" from buggy proxies or intentional firewalls
>> or intentional or accidental censorship systems ARE attacks.  They are
>> attacks on the fundamental end-to-end premise of the Internet.
> 
> But (1) bugs are different from intentional blockage and (2) not all
> of this is strictly speaking buggy.  The fact that some ancient
> gateway can't cope with RRTYPEs it doesn't know is, IMO, a disgrace;
> but they can say (correctly) that they just don't implement that RFC,
> and be quite right.  I would like the market to reject such devices as
> useless, but it hasn't yet.
> 
>> But the end result will be that (1) users will realize they are being
>> censored; (2) providers will clean up the accidental and whim-related
>> censorship; and (3) users will migrate to providers who offer them
>> reliable end-to-end service without interruptions for the provider's
>> convenience or profit.
> 
> I suppose that the above is intended to argue that the market will
> reject such devices as useless.  I think we have a first mover
> principle in the way, however.  These "users" of which you speak would
> need to form a fairly detailed theory of operation of the Internet in
> order to understand what the problem is.  I don't believe that most of
> them will, and I don't think they ought to need to either.  Therefore,
> I would prefer that we build documents that permit useful incremental
> addition of features to the network.
> 
> To drag this back on topic,

Thank you -- I was away from mail for part of today and this thread was going *way* off-topic…

*Please*, lets try and keep this (and other threads on dane@) on-topic, and civil….

> in light of the above I need to think
> harder about the argument, elsewhere in this thread, that uses 2 and 3
> are also undermined by the no-answer attack, because if that's the
> case then I suspect DANE is undeployable as it stands.



> 
> Best,
> 
> A
> 
> -- 
> Andrew Sullivan
> [e-mail]
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