Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS's new raw public keys

Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org> Fri, 30 May 2014 18:44 UTC

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Date: Fri, 30 May 2014 18:44:03 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
To: dane@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dane] Extending TLSA RFC to operate with TLS's new raw public keys
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On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 02:28:33PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote:

> On Fri, 30 May 2014, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> 
> >Would it be a problem if this got covered consistently in multiple
> >documents?  From the perspective of an implementor it would be
> >helpful to see this covered in which-ever document I happened to
> >be reading when adding bare public key support.
> 
> The bare public key document could refer to an ERRATA for 6698 that
> states an ASN.1 SPKI structure is to be considered a "PKIX certificate"
> in the context of TLSA certificate usage selectors?

Two problems with that:

    * The ERRATUM will likely be rejected, because the restriction was
      intentional.

    * This is the obvious part of how to use "oob public key" with
      DANE, and need hardly be explained.  The non-obvious part is the
      need to only signal "oob public key" support in the client
      when server's TLSA RRs contain *only* "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) ?"
      records.  I'll leave to the authors of that draft to decide
      whether that should be explained in their draft, or in a
      suitable separate DANE WG document.

-- 
	Viktor.