Re: [dane] Digest Algorithm Agility discussion

[Paul Wouters <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, 17 Mar 2014, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

>>>   * It should be possible for servers to publish TLSA records
>>>     employing multiple digest algorithms allowing clients to
>>>     choose the best mutually supported digest.
>>
>> Isn't that already possible?
>
> Not based on RFC 6698 alone.  With RFC 6698 the client trusts all
> TLSA records whether "weak" and "strong".

4.1 states:

       A TLSA RRSet whose DNSSEC validation state is secure MUST be used
       as a certificate association for TLS unless a local policy would
       prohibit the use of the specific certificate association in the
       secure TLSA RRSet.

Can that not be used to reject a weak digest?

> My proposal is essentially the same.  The client uses the strongest
> acceptable digest algorithm.  The *client* decides what "strongest"
> means.  It never chooses an unsupported algorithm.

but you want to fail if that one selected one fails. I don't think that
is the right decision.

>> If a certain digest is so weak it is basically broken, it should not be
>> left in a published TLSA record.
>
> Weak digests (say SHA2-256 if/when broken) cannot be easily removed
> from RRsets until all clients support stronger ones.  The idea is
> to publish stronger digests and deploy stronger clients, then remove
> weak digests later.  Stronger clients will never use the published
> weak records.  Otherwise there's an Internet-wide flag-day.

I don't think we disagree. the server publishes a new strong digest, and
clients that support that and consider sha2-256 weak will not use
sha2-256. If the admin messes up the new strong digest, than new clients
will fail to get a TLSA record, and old clients will use an unsafe one.

>> If the most prefered TLSA record fails validation, the client should try
>> another TLSA record.
>
> This works poorly.  While the weak algorithm is being phased out
> (years) even clients that support stronger algorithms are at risk.

New clients can have a local policy that states never to accept weak
digests. I don't see a problem with agility. The weak TLSA records
are only left in for clients that support nothing stronger.

>> This also gives the server admin some more protection. If they publish
>> digests using SHA2-256 and SHA1, and it turns out their tool generates
>> bad SHA2-256, than the clients still have a valid SHA1 to fall back to.
>
> They could also publish a bogus CU or selector, or mess up in many other
> ways.  I don't think that the intent of multiple algorithms in 6698 is
> to mask bogus data.

Maybe I don't understand what you think the problem is?

>> Perhaps there is text in the DS record RFC to look at that describes
>> this better than I just did.
>
> Perhaps Wes can chime in.  His comment to me was that the proposed
> DAA (digest algorithm agility) is essentially the only possible
> and largely analogous to the DNSSEC approach.

So aren't we all agreeing?

Paul