Re: [dane] DANE-EE(3) certificate matching rules? (Martin Rex) Mon, 17 March 2014 23:33 UTC

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From: (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [dane] DANE-EE(3) certificate matching rules?
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Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> I may have gone a bit further than necessary.  The main goal is to
> make DANE authentication usable in protocols with no user to "click
> OK".  To this end I want to avoid the most common operational
> failures with PKIX.  Therefore I propose that:
>     - In addition to name checks, expiration checks also be
>       performed via the TLSA RR signature lifetime, rather than
>       the certificate expiration date.  The TLSA record is updated
>       frequently as the DNSSEC zone is periodically re-signed.  This
>       ensures that there are no surprise expirations.  Certificates
>       can be replaced at the operator's convenience.
> Any comments? Can the above be the final consensus on this topic?

I strongly dislike this idea, and would really appreciate instead
a requirement that any X.509 certificates that are generated for use
with DANE-EE(3) *MUST* be generated with a sufficiently liberal
validity period that interop is not going to break if a DANE client
enforces the X.509 asserted validity period.