Re: [dane] domain hijacking

Alice Wonder <> Thu, 13 April 2017 05:04 UTC

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From: Alice Wonder <>
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Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2017 22:04:28 -0700
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Subject: Re: [dane] domain hijacking
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On 04/12/2017 10:02 PM, Alice Wonder wrote:
> On 04/12/2017 08:11 PM, John Levine wrote:
>>> If my suspicion is correct, has there
>>> been thought of re-signing the DS record signed with the older
>>> private key
>>> in a way that proves ownership through the key change?
>> This sounds to me like shutting the barn door after the horse is gone.
>> If it's important to you that your domain isn't hijacked, we all know
>> what to do, pick a registrar with good security and 2FA and so forth,
>> and monitor your own DNS with alarms if there are unauthorized changes.
>> Also, if we were to invent some sort of change signing, now you have
>> the other problem where the guy with the private key quits and takes
>> it with him, and you have to rebootstrap the zone somehow.
>> R's,
>> John
> I wonder if the future DANE equivalent of EV type validation is DS
> records at a well known location at the root of the domain (e.g.
> /ds.signed) signed by a trusted third party that clients can use to
> validate what is in their TLD.
> The only commercial CA issued certificates I personally have any
> confidence in as an end user are EV and that would give even more
> confidence.
> Use DANE to secure to public x.509 and when more confidence than DANE is
> needed, expensive commercial CA to secure the DS records. Cheap
> commercial CA wouldn't be needed because DANE already provides far more
> than domain validation certs can, only DS record certs that involve
> human validation would make sense, for things like banking or commerce
> or major social network.
> To work with more than HTTPS third party DS records could be sent with a
> future version of TLS or some kind of blockchain technology.

Meant to type "third party *signed* DS records"