Re: [dane] email canonicalization for SMIMEA owner names

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Sat, 13 December 2014 04:59 UTC

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Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 04:59:09 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: dane@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dane] email canonicalization for SMIMEA owner names
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On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 04:47:37AM -0000, John Levine wrote:

> >I was thinking of multiplexing by port, rather than URI.  So that
> >the service in question really could be a light-weight HTTPS server
> >add-on to an MTA, rather than an HTTP application in a general
> >purpose HTTPS server.
> 
> Before we go too far down this road, we might check with some people
> who run large mail systems and ask how likely they are to spin up an
> all new address verification server.  It doesn't seem very likely to
> me.
> 
> The DNS has its faults, but it has the great advantage of already existing.

And of course ask them also how likely they are to publish per-user
keys in DNS, other than perhaps a wildcard trust-anchor.

In other words, were they to provide access to a key lookup service,
what are the relevant design constraints.

Perhaps Ian Fette can comment from a Gmail perspective.

Also do they see key lookup for encryption on first contact as a
requirement?  Or is signature-only first contact with encryption
keys provided optionally on reply, their preferred  model for
encryption key distribution.

-- 
	Viktor.