Re: [dane] draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-00 comments

Petr Spacek <pspacek@redhat.com> Tue, 22 April 2014 14:34 UTC

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Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2014 16:34:06 +0200
From: Petr Spacek <pspacek@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [dane] draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-00 comments
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On 22.4.2014 14:49, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 10:43:18AM +0200, Petr Spacek wrote:
>
>> 3) Algorithm agility:
>> It is clear to me that SHA2-224 hashing is there "just" for privacy and
>> nothing else. Still, I think it would be beneficial to have algorithm
>> agility built-in.
>
> In this specification sha2-224 does not play a security role.  It
Hmm, I should have read section 5.1 more than once :-)

> is used not for privacy but rather as a short-enough and yet strongly
> collision resistant representation of potentially longer email
> addresses that would not fit into a DNS label.  It is expected that
> There is no need for "algorithm agility" here.  This is a lookup
> key construct, not a tamper-resistant signature.  In fact multiple
Just to be clear - I have never used term "tamper-resistant" in this context.

> algorithms would be entirely counter-productive in this context.
I agree. I'm sorry for the noise created by my comment (3).

My comments (1), (2) and the second e-mail with question about CERT RR still 
apply.

-- 
Petr^2 Spacek