IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [dane] Behavior in the face of no answer?

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Tue, 15 May 2012 17:20 UTC

Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: dane@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dane@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7698B21F8830 for <dane@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 May 2012 10:20:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.087
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.087 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.162, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id C+pM91knVmcj for <dane@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 15 May 2012 10:20:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpde02.sap-ag.de (smtpde02.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.140]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EF1E21F8829 for <dane@ietf.org>; Tue, 15 May 2012 10:20:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde02.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id q4FHKFtK002915 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 15 May 2012 19:20:15 +0200 (MEST)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201205151720.q4FHKEpY022449@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: ekr@rtfm.com (Eric Rescorla)
Date: Tue, 15 May 2012 19:20:14 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBMgQR9kLn50fVxx8_kihr5ZvZ8PnhEoHbo9=25ZcQeoKw@mail.gmail.com> from "Eric Rescorla" at May 15, 12 10:05:46 am
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-SAP: out
Cc: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org, dane@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dane] Behavior in the face of no answer?
X-BeenThere: dane@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities <dane.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dane>, <mailto:dane-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane>
List-Post: <mailto:dane@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dane-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane>, <mailto:dane-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 15 May 2012 17:20:17 -0000

Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 10:04 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> > Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>
> >> On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 9:52 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> >> > And as a fallback, browsers could use a TLSA & server-cert lock, i.e.
> >> > memorizing information from the last visit of a site and using that
> >> > to perform server endpoint identification in case that DNSSEC lookups
> >> > fail when roaming.
> >>
> >> At which point it's hard to understand how this is better than cert pinning
> >> via HSTS.
> >
> > Such a TLSA & server-cert lock is supposed to be transient substitute for
> > the lack of DNSSEC connectivity.  That memorized information will need
> > to be updated whenever full DNSSEC connectivity is available.
> 
> And the HSTS information can be updated whenever you go to the server.

In case that you are referring to this:

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security

it seems to only convey an indication from the server to the client
to use HTTPS rather than HTTP to access the server.

DANE/TLSA is supposed to provide an (independent) confirmation from the 
DNS admin, that the server certificate presented by the server is the
*real* one.

I somehow fail to see what these two have in common.

-Martin

v2.8.7 | Report a Bug | By Email