Re: [dane] Behavior in the face of no answer?

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Wed, 16 May 2012 07:53 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: warren@kumari.net (Warren Kumari)
Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 09:53:54 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <A0B2E24D-63C8-4CFB-AA99-4BD65EB76739@kumari.net> from "Warren Kumari" at May 15, 12 03:32:44 pm
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Cc: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org, dane@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dane] Behavior in the face of no answer?
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Warren Kumari wrote:
> > 
> > I don't think people have been talking about suggesting that the
> > application let the user choose between strict and not-strict;
> > I think most people here are against that.
> 
> This may be my fault -- a long time back (in this thread) I proposed
> having implmentations default to not-strict and then, in a few years
> (once there is less DNSSEC breakage by CPE, etc), vendors would turn
> the knob to strict mode. Educated / security concious users would
> also be able to turn the knob if they so  desired.
> 
> This was just an idea, and perhaps a bad one!

That was a perfectly reasonable one, and is the approach that is being
used for the TLS renegotiation_info extension (rfc5746):

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-4

And no, the world did not end because of browsers and other TLS-clients
not being strict about TLS renegotiation (i.e. hard-failing on
servers that do not support it).


-Martin