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Re: [dane] Behavior in the face of no answer?

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 15 May 2012 17:50 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 15 May 2012 10:49:45 -0700
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Cc: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org, dane@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dane] Behavior in the face of no answer?
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On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 10:20 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 10:04 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>> > Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 9:52 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>> >> > And as a fallback, browsers could use a TLSA & server-cert lock, i.e.
>> >> > memorizing information from the last visit of a site and using that
>> >> > to perform server endpoint identification in case that DNSSEC lookups
>> >> > fail when roaming.
>> >>
>> >> At which point it's hard to understand how this is better than cert pinning
>> >> via HSTS.
>> >
>> > Such a TLSA & server-cert lock is supposed to be transient substitute for
>> > the lack of DNSSEC connectivity.  That memorized information will need
>> > to be updated whenever full DNSSEC connectivity is available.
>>
>> And the HSTS information can be updated whenever you go to the server.
>
> In case that you are referring to this:
>
>  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security

http://tools.ietf.org/wg/websec/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/

-Ekr

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