Re: [dane] [saag] Need better opportunistic terminology

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Wed, 12 March 2014 13:35 UTC

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Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 09:35:15 -0400
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Subject: Re: [dane] [saag] Need better opportunistic terminology
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Joe,

> ...
>> with that definition of the term, which is IPsec-specific.
>
> I'm not quite sure what term or what definition you're referring to: 
> OE, anonymous encryption, or unauthenticated key exchange. Can you 
> clarify?
OE. I argue that OE is defined only for IPsec, because the definition 
focuses on how to
avoid the need to coordinate SPD entries at each end.
>
>> I have
>> suggested "opportunistic keying" as a preferred term, since its the
>> key management, not the encryption per se, that distinguishes other
>> proposed modes of operation for IPsec, TLS, etc.
>
> I agree if you're replacing OE with OK ;-)
yeah, I like OK (and I like IKE too, for those of us old enough to
appreciate that election slogan)
>
>> The breakout group at the STRINT workshop that discussed terminology
>> suggested using the term noted above.
>
> Sorry, but to clarify, which term?
OK vs. OE.

Steve