Re: [dane] [saag] Need better opportunistic terminology

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Wed, 12 March 2014 20:53 UTC

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Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 20:53:06 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, Peter Palfrader <peter@palfrader.org>
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Subject: Re: [dane] [saag] Need better opportunistic terminology
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Hi Michael,

On 03/12/2014 08:47 PM, Michael Richardson wrote:
> The part that we are all discussing is determining how (much) to
> trust the DH results.

I don't think that's a very accurate characterisation
to be honest.

I think the most relevant (but intertwined) factors are:

- - trading off ease of deployment vs. endpoint authentication
- - trading off protection against passive vs active attack
- - better separating key exchange from endpoint authentication
  so that traditional authentication or TOFU or whatever can
  be used before during or after key exchange

S.
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