Re: [dane] dual use of TLSA RR

"shmick@riseup.net" <shmick@riseup.net> Fri, 10 October 2014 15:19 UTC

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Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 02:19:36 +1100
From: "shmick@riseup.net" <shmick@riseup.net>
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Subject: Re: [dane] dual use of TLSA RR
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thanks,

Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 02:36:42AM +1100, shmick@riseup.net wrote:
> 
>> is it possible & legal to incorporate 2 TLSA RRs in a zone file the
>> following way for the same protocol/port ie. 25:
> 
> Yes, absolutely.  Multiple TLSA RRs can and will appear in a TLSA
> RRset, either as a result of key rotation in progress, or because
> there are multiple keys valid at the same time.

i signed my zonefile ok and have the following:

_25._tcp.ns1.example.net. IN CNAME tlsa311._dane.example.net.

tlsa311._dane.example.net. IN TLSA 3 1 1
4e02a17b48f8dd3fb451871222278d248c3f51ea5f25ec2e06f65096c80391b0 ; ECC

tlsa311._dane.example.net. IN TLSA 3 1 1
9ff5a335ddb86c368a9b3fc49d1a81f738d57f8f8f96c973e87513bbf24532c3 ; RSA

im waiting for confirmation from somebody that they see "Verified TLS
conn..."

> 
>> Assume postfix has setup 2 certs; an RSA and ECDSA
>>
>> If it's possible how would a particular TLSA RR be chosen?
> 
> Each TLSA RRs is compared against the server's chain until one
> matches.
> 
>> Is it based upon negotiated cipher?
> 
> No, generally the TLSA RR does not signal a particular public key
> algorithm.  With matching type Full(0) one could infer the algorithm
> from public key, but in practice it is easier to just compare the
> bits regardless.
>