Re: [dane] [IPsec] Bootstrapping IPSec from DNSSSEC/DANE

Paul Wouters <paul@cypherpunks.ca> Sun, 22 September 2013 01:53 UTC

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Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2013 21:53:45 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@cypherpunks.ca>
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Cc: "<ipsec@ietf.org>" <ipsec@ietf.org>, "<david.lloyd@fsmail.net>" <david.lloyd@fsmail.net>, "<dane@ietf.org>" <dane@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dane] [IPsec] Bootstrapping IPSec from DNSSSEC/DANE
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On Sat, 21 Sep 2013, Yoav Nir wrote:

> I believe this would require a separate document. But I'm not sure that tying it to an IP address is appropriate. IKE implementations work from behind NAT devices and sometimes move around (see MOBIKE), so I think it would be more appropriate to tie the record to any type of ID payload that we have in IKE: IP address and FQDN at least, maybe also KEYID and RFC822 address.
>
> You might need to profile the IKE IDs used for this.

> On Sep 21, 2013, at 2:31 PM, david.lloyd@fsmail.net wrote:

>> I am interested	in using a variant of DANE to bootstrap my IPSec IKE root certificate trust.  Is anyone aware of any work been done in this area?
>>
>> From my understanding, it looks as though the is no technical issue with using reverse DNS lookup for the IPSec target machine with DNSSec (although this may be a little unreliable on the "real-world" internet), so returning standard DANE entries for the IPSec certificate.  Then I would simply use these as part of the standard IPSec certificate validation algorithm.
>>
>> Looking at similar proposed applications of DANE, such as the draft-ietf-dane-srv, mostly this involves defining an appropriate protocol query name (for example _ipsec.123.123.123.123.in-addr.arpa).
>>
>> Is this something that would fit into an existing document either from the IKE side or the DANE side?  Or would	it be worth me creating an more extensive proposal?

We (freeswan) tried to use the reverse and failed. It's even worse now
with IPv6.

If you think of clients running a DNSSEC validating resolver themselves,
than having a module in the DNS server that looks up IPSECKEY records in
the forward, signed by DNSSEC, and then instructs the IKE daemon to
setup a tunnel would require no new standards document. Just ensure you
ignore the "gateway" property as it is not secure without the coupling
to the reverse tree.

Paul