Re: [dbound] [EXTERNAL] Re: RDBD 01 Comments

"John R Levine" <johnl@taugh.com> Fri, 22 March 2019 15:35 UTC

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Date: 22 Mar 2019 11:35:32 -0400
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From: "John R Levine" <johnl@taugh.com>
To: "Brotman, Alexander" <Alexander_Brotman@comcast.com>
Cc: "dbound@ietf.org" <dbound@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dbound] [EXTERNAL] Re: RDBD 01 Comments
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> The original intent was a providing a bit more of a hurdle to falsifying 
> responses.  I didn't think we could realistically rely on DNSSEC as a 
> requirement (I'm imagining a situation where we have DNSSEC, and someone 
> goes off to Route53 to host a domain where DNSSEC is not supported last 
> I knew), so was hoping this would provide a bit more of a loose 
> assurance that this relationship is intentional.

I still don't get it.  If you're the primary and you have DNSSEC, you can 
with great security publish pointers to all of the secondaries, no extra 
crypto required.  If you're a primary and you don't have DNSSEC, a bad guy 
can with some effort fake a key record and you lose anyway.  Faking a 
primary->secondary pointer or faking a key record are equally hard or 
easy.

Perhaps it would be helpful to make a chart for situations where the 
primary or secondary are and aren't signed, and are and aren't attacked 
and see which (if any) boxes have interesting different outcomes.

R's,
John

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>;
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 2:04 PM
>> To: dbound@ietf.org
>> Cc: Brotman, Alexander <Alexander_Brotman@cable.comcast.com>;
>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [dbound] RDBD 01 Comments
>>
>> In article
>> <ac159edaa05641ffa59e7358209ea0a4@COPDCEX19.cable.comcast.com>; you
>> write:
>>> Hello folks,
>>>
>>> Stephen and I are still looking for additional comments on the newer
>>> revision of RDBD [1].  We'd really like to work with everyone to move
>>> this forward if possible.  Additionally, he and I should both be in Prague next
>> week if you'd like to have some in-person discussions.
>>>
>>> Thank you for your time
>>>
>>> [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brotman-rdbd-01
>>
>> Hm.  I see that instead of DKIM-like signatures, now it's DNSSEC-like
>> signatures.
>>
>> But I still have the same question: what advantage does all of this crypto stuff
>> provide compared to a much simpler design where the two domains just
>> have records that point at each other, like a cut down version of Andrew's
>> SOPA?
>>
>> One difference is that you can't tell by looking at the primary/relating domain
>> what its secondary/related domains are.  I can't tell if that's a bug or a
>> feature.
>

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@taugh.com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly