Re: [dbound] draft-brotman-rdbd

"John Levine" <johnl@taugh.com> Mon, 01 April 2019 16:19 UTC

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Date: 1 Apr 2019 12:18:59 -0400
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From: "John Levine" <johnl@taugh.com>
To: dbound@ietf.org
Cc: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dbound/l_bpBRI4xmXUeYhJdZd-u3Ky_wg>
Subject: Re: [dbound] draft-brotman-rdbd
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In article <cb41ecd0-c48d-b204-7ab1-f59ff330bda3@cs.tcd.ie>; you write:
>Fully agree that cache poisoning is a relevant threat for any
>application that would use RDBD values read from DNS without
>sufficient additional local validation to make a decision.

Could you give some concrete examples of additional local validation,
other than DNSSEC?

As far as I can tell nobody does anything like that for DKIM keys.