Re: [Dcrup] FW: IETF WG state changed for draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-usage

"John Levine" <johnl@taugh.com> Tue, 15 August 2017 02:37 UTC

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Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2017 01:33:33 -0000
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From: John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
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Subject: Re: [Dcrup] FW: IETF WG state changed for draft-ietf-dcrup-dkim-usage
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In article <8695284.qrNCWkNy01@kitterma-e6430> you write:
>> Another way to look at this: I think it's more appropriate to render
>> rsa-sha1 obsolete, but this approach seems as if we want to act like it
>> never existed.
>
>Fast forward a few years:  Is the fact that it ever existed relevant to 
>anything?  I think it's highly unlikely.  

The Internet being the Internet, sha-1 hashes will trickle in forever.
I'd rather have the diagnostic say "obsolete hash" than "syntax
error."

If you look at this curdle draft that deprecates RC4, it goes through
and makes changes to turn OPTIONAL to MUST NOT and the like, but it
doesn't try to undefine the obsolete rc4 crypto modes.  I think you'll
find that typical in crypto updates.


https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die/

R's,
John