Re: [Dcrup] rsa-sha1 proposals

[Scott Kitterman <[e-mail]>]

On Tuesday, June 20, 2017 09:18:56 AM Seth Blank wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 8:39 AM, Scott Kitterman <[e-mail]>
> 
> wrote:
> > Remove rsa-sha1:
> > This option eliminates (to the extent it is adopted) the potential of
> > security
> > risks with rsa-sha1.  If a relevant issue with rsa-sha1 is made public,
> > there
> > will be no further standards work that needs to be done.  This option also
> > keeps the number of algorithms at two, eliminating the additional
> > complexity
> > associated with having more algorithms to sort through in implementation.
> > While this might be considered somewhat abrupt, rsa-sha1 signing has been
> > effectively SHOULD NOT for a decade.  Maybe this will create some momentum
> > for
> > operators to move off of it.
> > 
> > It is abrupt to remove something without a formal deprecation period.
> 
> I strongly vote to remove SHA1 as proposed here; I do not believe any other
> approach will incentivize senders or receivers to make the change.
> 
> I do not believe this qualifies as an "abrupt" deprecation, as you said, it
> has been SHOULD NOT for over a decade.

Modulo the IETF doesn't vote, I agree, but then you knew that already.  
Hopefully the responses give enough information for the chairs to develop an 
opinion about where the consensus is on this issue.

Thanks,

Scott K