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To: dcrup@ietf.org
From: Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com>
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Subject: Re: [Dcrup] rsa-sha1 usage
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On June 13, 2017 11:16:11 PM EDT, "Murray S=2E Kucherawy" <superuser@gmail=
=2Ecom> wrote:
>On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 6:55 PM, Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn=2Enet>
>wrote:
>
>> That being the case, why do we think people will pay attention to a
>MUST
>> NOT today?
>>
>>
>> Because implementations will stop supporting rsa-sha1, forcing the
>issue
>> for any who upgrade=2E I'm all for having them stop supporting signing
>with
>> rsa-sha1, but they should continue to support verification for a
>while=2E
>>
>
>We can't have this logic both ways=2E  Scott claimed nobody pays
>attention to
>the advice in RFCs ("Operational practice=E2=80=8B isn't closely coupled =
with
>standards changes")=2E  If that's true, then there's no meat to a MUST
>NOT
>anyway, and it really only matters what people will implement=2E  And if
>that's true, then saying current implementations neither sign with nor
>verify "rsa-sha1" because it's deprecated suffices, and we're done=2E

What I should have said is sometimes standards lead and sometimes they fol=
low=2E  Bumping up the minimum RSA key size is the standards community catc=
hing up to what the operational community did half a decade ago=2E  OTOH, I=
 think rsa-sha1 usage will decline once there is strong MUST NOT guidance p=
ublished=2E  Not immediately, but considering the mail system development, =
deployment, upgrade life cycle it's much better to give things a good push =
in that direction now, before its time to panic=2E=2E

Scott K

