< draft-ietf-detnet-architecture-12-initial.txt		draft-ietf-detnet-architecture-12.txt >
	skipping to change at page 3, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 20 ¶
	4.7.1. Exporting flow identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		4.7.1. Exporting flow identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	4.7.2. Flow attribute mapping between layers . . . . . . . . 34		4.7.2. Flow attribute mapping between layers . . . . . . . . 34
	4.7.3. Flow-ID mapping examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		4.7.3. Flow-ID mapping examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	4.8. Advertising resources, capabilities and adjacencies . . . 36		4.8. Advertising resources, capabilities and adjacencies . . . 36
	4.9. Scaling to larger networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		4.9. Scaling to larger networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	4.10. Compatibility with Layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		4.10. Compatibility with Layer-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document provides the overall architecture for Deterministic		This document provides the overall architecture for Deterministic
	Networking (DetNet), which provides a capability for the delivery of		Networking (DetNet), which provides a capability for the delivery of
	data flows with extremely low packet loss rates and bounded end-to-		data flows with extremely low packet loss rates and bounded end-to-
	end delivery latency. DetNet is for networks that are under a single		end delivery latency. DetNet is for networks that are under a single
	administrative control or within a closed group of administrative		administrative control or within a closed group of administrative
	control; these include campus-wide networks and private WANs. DetNet		control; these include campus-wide networks and private WANs. DetNet
	skipping to change at page 37, line 51 ¶		skipping to change at page 37, line 51 ¶
	service to, a higher layer DetNet system.		service to, a higher layer DetNet system.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	Security considerations for DetNet are described in detail in		Security considerations for DetNet are described in detail in
	[I-D.ietf-detnet-security]. This section considers exclusively		[I-D.ietf-detnet-security]. This section considers exclusively
	security considerations which are specific to the DetNet		security considerations which are specific to the DetNet
	Architecture.		Architecture.
	Security aspects which are unique to DetNet are those whose aim is to		Security aspects which are unique to DetNet are those whose aim is to
	secure the specific quality of service aspects of DetNet, which are		provide the specific quality of service aspects of DetNet, which are
	primarily to deliver data flows with extremely low packet loss rates		primarily to deliver data flows with extremely low packet loss rates
	and bounded end-to-end delivery latency. A DetNet is implemented		and bounded end-to-end delivery latency. A DetNet may be implemented
	using MPLS and IP (including both v4 and v6) technologies, and thus		using MPLS and/or IP (including both v4 and v6) technologies, and
	inherits the security properties of those technologies at both the		thus inherits the security properties of those technologies at both
	control plane and the data plane.		the control plane and the data plane.
	Security considerations for DetNet are constrained (compared to, for		Security considerations for DetNet are constrained (compared to, for
	example, the open Internet) because DetNet is defined to operate only		example, the open Internet) because DetNet is defined to operate only
	within a single administrative domain (see Section 1). The primary		within a single administrative domain (see Section 1). The primary
	considerations are to secure the request and control of DetNet		considerations are to secure the request and control of DetNet
	resources, maintain confidentiality of data traversing the DetNet,		resources, maintain confidentiality of data traversing the DetNet,
	and provide uninterrupted availability of the DetNet quality of		and provide the availability of the DetNet quality of service.
	service.
	To secure the request and control of DetNet resources, authentication		To secure the request and control of DetNet resources, authentication
	and authorization must be provided for each device connected to a		and authorization can be used for each device connected to a DetNet
	DetNet domain, most importantly to network controller devices.		domain, most importantly to network controller devices. Control of a
	Control of a DetNet network may be centralized or distributed (within		DetNet network may be centralized or distributed (within a single
	a single administrative domain). In the case of centralized control,		administrative domain). In the case of centralized control,
	precedent for security considerations as defined for Abstraction and		precedent for security considerations as defined for Abstraction and
	Control of Traffic Engineered Networks (ACTN) can be found in		Control of Traffic Engineered Networks (ACTN) can be found in
	[RFC8453], Section 9. In the case of a distributed control		[RFC8453], Section 9. In the case of a distributed control
	protocols, DetNet security is expected to be provided by the security		protocols, DetNet security is expected to be provided by the security
	properties of the protocols in use. In any case, the result must be		properties of the protocols in use. In any case, the result is that
	that manipulation of administratively configurable parameters is		manipulation of administratively configurable parameters is limited
	limited to authorized entities.		to authorized entities.
	To maintain confidentiality of data traversing the DetNet,		To maintain confidentiality of data traversing the DetNet,
	application flows must be protected through whatever means is		application flows can be protected through whatever means is provided
	provided by the underlying technology. For example, encryption may		by the underlying technology. For example, encryption may be used,
	be used, such as that provided by IPSec for IP (Layer 3) flows and by		such as that provided by IPSec [RFC4301] for IP (Layer 3) flows and
	MACSec for Ethernet (Layer 2) flows. DetNet flows are identified on		by MACSec [IEEE802.1AE-2018] for Ethernet (Layer 2) flows.
	a per-flow basis, which may provide attackers with additional
	information about the data flows (when compared to networks that do		DetNet flows are identified on a per-flow basis, which may provide
	not include per-flow identification); this is an inherent property of		attackers with additional information about the data flows (when
	DetNet which has security implications which must be considered when		compared to networks that do not include per-flow identification).
	determining if DetNet is a suitable technology for any given use		This is an inherent property of DetNet which has security
	case. Similar consideration may need to be given to the use of		implications which should be considered when determining if DetNet is
	replicated packet flows, which result in increased surface for		a suitable technology for any given use case.
	Reconnaissance attacks. In any case, the result must be that the
	confidentiality of the data is maintained to a degree sufficient for
	the use cases addressed by the given DetNet implementation.
	To provide uninterrupted availability of the DetNet quality of		To provide uninterrupted availability of the DetNet quality of
	service, provisions must be made against DOS attacks and delay		service, provisions can be made against DOS attacks and delay
	attacks. To protect against DOS attacks, excess traffic due to		attacks. To protect against DOS attacks, excess traffic due to
	malicious or malfunctioning devices must be prevented or mitigated,		malicious or malfunctioning devices can be prevented or mitigated,
	for example through the use of traffic admission control applied at		for example through the use of traffic admission control applied at
	the input of a DetNet domain, as described in Section 3.2.1, and		the input of a DetNet domain, as described in Section 3.2.1, and
	through the fault mitigation methods described in Section 3.3.2.		through the fault mitigation methods described in Section 3.3.2. To
			prevent DetNet packets from being delayed by an entity external to a
	To prevent DetNet packets from being delayed, protection must be		DetNet domain, DetNet technology definition can allow for the
	provided against Man-In-The-Middle attacks, for example through use		mitigation of Man-In-The-Middle attacks, for example through use of
	of authentication and authorization of devices within the DetNet		authentication and authorization of devices within the DetNet domain.
	domain.
	Time synchronization methods are not specified by DetNet, however any
	time synchronization method used with DetNet must also be secured,
	using the security methods available for the given time
	synchronization mechanism, for example as described in [RFC7384].
	In any case, the result must be that the DetNet is protected from		Because DetNet mechanisms or applications that rely on DetNet can
	DOS, delay, and time manipulation attacks to the extent sufficient		make heavy use of methods that require precise time synchronization,
	for the use cases addressed by the given DetNet implementation.		the accuracy, availability, and integrity of time synchronization is
			of critical importance. Extensive discussion of this topic can be
			found in [RFC7384].
	DetNet use cases are known to have widely divergent security		DetNet use cases are known to have widely divergent security
	requirements. The intent of this section is to provide a baseline		requirements. The intent of this section is to provide a baseline
	for security considerations which are common to all DetNet designs		for security considerations which are common to all DetNet designs
	and implementations, without burdening individual designs with		and implementations, without burdening individual designs with
	specifics of security infrastructure which may not be germane to the		specifics of security infrastructure which may not be germane to the
	given use case. Designers and Implementers of DetNet systems are		given use case. Designers and Implementers of DetNet systems are
	expected to take use case specific considerations into account in		expected to take use case specific considerations into account in
	their DetNet designs and implementations.		their DetNet designs and implementations.
End of changes. 11 change blocks.
	45 lines changed or deleted		37 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/