Re: [dhcwg] Trust model of Client FQDN option

On Aug 4, 2004, at 11:18 AM, Bernie Volz wrote:
> And, we probably should add a 4th point ... If a DNS server allows 
> dynamic
> DNS updates, it is the final authority of what it allows to be added,
> removed, or modified in a zone and should have properly configured 
> policies
> to prohibit operations that are not intended. Simply assuming that any
> update from a trusted source (such as a DHCP server with a valid TSIG 
> key)
> should be performed is likely not acceptable.

I would expect this to be a rather controversial statement, and I think 
we should leave it out.   It could be equally legitimately argued that 
if you give some entity a key to update a zone, you are trusting that 
entity not to do anything inappropriate with the key, and that if you 
do  not trust that entity, you should not have given it such a key.

I'm not saying either position is correct - they are both valid.   So 
asserting one over the other seems like a recipe for delay.

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