Re: [dhcwg] [EXTERNAL] Re: [v6ops] Re: Question to DHCPv6 Relay Implementors regarding draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-pd-relay-requirements

Fred, according to RFC6221:

>    The LDRA MUST copy the IP source address from the client-originated
>    message into the peer-address field of the Relay-Forward message.
>    The LDRA MUST copy the link-layer source address from the client-
>    originated message into the link-layer source address of the Relay-
>    Forward message.

This is also true for the destination address. So if that is what my mean by an “L2 proxy,” I don’t think that the original MAC address would be hidden by it.

> On Oct 13, 2020, at 1:44 PM, Templin (US), Fred L <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com> wrote:
> 
> Michael, what I was referring to below as "failure" is the proxy case when
> there is an L2 proxy P between the client and relay (e.g., RFC489). There
> could be many clients A, B, C, D, etc. on downstream link segments of
> the proxy, with the relay R on an upstream link segment. The relay would
> then not see the individual client MAC addresses A, B, C, D, etc. - it would
> see only the proxy MAC address P in all cases. So, it is true that an RPF
> check in the relay would drop a packet from client A addressed to itself,
> but it would also drop any of client A's packets addressed to clients B,
> C, D, etc. That is what I meant by "failure" in this context.
> 
> Fred
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Michael Richardson [mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca]
>> Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2020 10:03 AM
>> To: Templin (US), Fred L <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>; ianfarrer@gmx.com; Jen Linkova <furry13@gmail.com>; dhcwg
>> <dhcwg@ietf.org>; v6ops list <v6ops@ietf.org>; 6man <ipv6@ietf.org>
>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [dhcwg] [v6ops] Re: Question to DHCPv6 Relay Implementors regarding draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-pd-relay-
>> requirements
>> 
>> 
>> Templin (US), Fred L <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com> wrote:
>>>> For multi-access links, when the packet's
>>>> ingress and egress interface match, and the source MAC and next-hop MAC addresses
>>>> match.
>> 
>>> As I said, this gets very tricky if the client has multiple MACs. If Client A has MAC addresses
>>> a1, a2, a3, a4, etc. it becomes very difficult for the relay to know that a packet received
>>> from one of the MAC addresses (e.g., a1) must not be sent back to another of the MAC
>>> addresses (e.g., a3). I think another failure case is if there is a proxy between the client
>>> and relay. In that case, the relay will see the MAC address of the proxy and not the
>>> MAC address of client A. And, if there were multiple additional clients B, C, D, etc.
>>> sharing the same proxy then the proposed check could block legitimate
>>> traffic.
>> 
>> okay, but let's be clear about what "failure" here means.
>> If the client has multiple MAC addresses, then the router *fails* to
>> eliminate the loop.  It does not drop traffic it shouldn't.
>> So this policy doesn't make the situation worse.
>> 
>> I don't know what kind of relay you are talking about.
>> If it's a L2 switching fabric, and it rewrites mac addressess, then there is
>> a problem.
>> 
>> If it's an L3 router, then yes, the MAC address will change.
>> But, that L3 router will *also* need a route to the client.
>> That first L3 router should be the one dropping the traffic.
>> 
>>> As I said before, I think the better fix is to instrument the client. If the client receives
>>> a packet on its relay-facing interface, and the routing system determines that the
>>> packet should be forwarded out the same interface via a default route, the client
>>> must drop the packet. That way, the relay never sees a looped packet, and there
>>> is no extraneous traffic on the client/relay interface.
>> 
>> I agree that it should *also* be fixed on the client.
>> 
>> 1) The client will never do any forwarding if the the client has forwarding
>>   turned off.
>> 
>> 2) There are many cases where there are legitimate reasons to have an
>>   one-armed router like this.  So, whatever text you right must be sure that
>>   the client is looking at the same packet, and not the IPsec transformed one.
>>   (The Linux kernel does not make this trivial to get right, for instance)
>> 
>> 
>> --
>> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
>>           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
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