Re: [Dime] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04: (with COMMENT)

["Ben Campbell" <[e-mail]>]

On 1 Jun 2016, at 14:37, Ben Campbell wrote:

> I may not have been clear, but my concern was not that I though there 
> should be a non-repudiation requirement. It was that the text seemed 
> to have an implicit one, and if that was intended, it should be 
> explicit.

(To further clarify after re-reading my notes...)

I inferred the "implied" requirement from the fact that non-repudiation 
was used as the motivating example for the asymmetric algorithm 
requirement. That made the little voice in my head ask "Wait, is 
non-repudiation a requirement?"

Ben.


>
> I'm also perfectly happy for the draft to not have such a requirement 
> (implicit or otherwise.)
>
> Ben.
>
> On 1 Jun 2016, at 14:32, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
>> Thanks all for the discussion. I've one thing to add... as you
>> may detect, it's a thing about which I'm not neutral:-)
>>
>> On 01/06/16 19:14, Jouni Korhonen wrote:
>>>
>>>> - Requirement 7: This (along with some text in the introduction) 
>>>> implies
>>>> that non-repudiation is a requirement. If so, that should be listed 
>>>> and
>>>> elaborated as a requirement.
>>>
>>> I believe tnon-repudiation is already covered by the requirement #2,
>>> which says "..integrity, and data-origin authentication."
>>
>> I'll put a DISCUSS on this if anyone adds non-repudiation as
>> a requirement! :-)
>>
>> Non-repudiation is not a network service, even though it has been
>> described as one for decades. (Blame the security addendum to the
>> OSI reference model - afaik, that's where it started;-)
>>
>> If one wants to provide what was claimed to be provided by
>> non-repudiation then one needs signed timestamps for pretty much
>> everything (and with counter signing for algorithm changes) and
>> distributed logs with signed events (and log integrity) for things
>> that happen at all nodes, and much else. None of that is useful for
>> Diameter and it therefore ought not be mentioned. Even were it
>> claimed to be useful, one would need to define a whole bunch of
>> new AVPs to try (but fail) to provide that fictional service.
>>
>> Jouni is IMO correct that data origin authentication and data
>> integrity are the network security services that are relevant
>> and that can be offered here.
>>
>> All that said, this is likely just a terminology thing, since
>> some people do still use the NR term when they mean integrity
>> and DAO with signatures, but it is *really* not a good idea to
>> add the NR term to the mix as it has distracted and misdirected
>> folks for literally decades and going back to that would be a
>> bad plan.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> S.